



Abstract: What is the relationship between saying ‘I know that Q’ and
guaranteeing  that  Q?  John  Austin,  Roderick  Chisholm  and
Wilfrid  Sellars  all  agreed  that  there  was  some  important
connection,  but  disagreed  over  what  exactly  it  was.  In  this
paper I discuss each of their accounts, and present a new one
of my own. I suggest that the relation is this: by saying ‘I know
that  Q’,  you  represent  yourself  as  having  the  authority  to
guarantee that Q.
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1. Introduction
What is the relationship between saying ‘I know that Sarah won’
and guaranteeing that Sarah won, or more generally between saying
‘I  know that Q’  and guaranteeing that Q? John Austin,  Roderick
Chisholm and Wilfrid Sellars all agreed that there was some impor-
tant connection, but disagreed over what exactly it was. In this pa-
per I discuss each of their accounts, and present a new one of my
own.
Austin said the relationship between ‘I know’ and guaranteeing
amounts to this: when you say ‘I know that Q’, you thereby guaran-
tee that Q. Chisholm said the relationship is this: sometimes, but
1
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not always, when you say ‘I know that Q’, you thereby guarantee
that Q. Sellars said the relationship is this: ‘I know that Q’ means
the same thing as ‘Q, and I have reasons good enough to guarantee
Q’. I say the relationship is this: by saying ‘I know that Q’, you rep-
resent yourself as having the authority to guarantee that Q.
Here is the paper’s plan. Section 2 covers Austin’s view. Section
3 covers Chisholm’s view. Section 4 covers Sellars’s view. Section 5
presents my view. Section 6 concludes the discussion.
2. Austin
Austin thought that the relationship between ‘I know’ and guaran-
teeing amounts to this: when you say ‘I know that Q’, you thereby
guarantee that Q.
Austin likens ‘I know’ to ‘I promise’. ‘I promise’ is a performa-
tive utterance. Let ‘A’ name an action type. In a normal situation, if
you say ‘I promise to A’, then you thereby promise to A. Your aim in
saying ‘I promise’ is not to describe or report anything, but to make
a promise.  Its  purpose  is  not  descriptive,  but  performative.  Says
Austin,
[W]hen I say “I promise” . .  .  I have not merely an-
nounced  my  intention,  but,  by  using  that  formula
(performing this ritual), I have bound myself to oth-
ers,  and staked my reputation,  in a new way.  Simi-
larly, saying “I know” is taking a new plunge. But it is
not saying “I have performed a specially striking feat
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of cognition, superior, in the same scale as believing
and being sure, even to being merely quite sure”: for
there  is nothing in that scale superior to being quite
sure. Just as promising is not something superior, in
the  same  scale  as  hoping  and  intending,  even  to
merely  fully  intending:  for  there  is nothing  in  that
scale superior to fully intending. When I say “I know
[that Q]”, I give others my word: I give others my au-
thority for saying that [“Q”]. (Austin 1946: 171)
‘I know’ is not “a descriptive phrase” either, says Austin (1946:
174). To say ‘I know that Q’ is not to “describe” some special cogni-
tive achievement of ours regarding Q.1 Instead,  it  is  to do some-
thing, namely, to “give others my word” that Q is the case, thereby
authorizing them to repeat ‘Q’. And since Austin considers ‘give my
word’ and ‘guarantee’ to be interchangeable in these matters (see
the dagger (†) footnote on p. 173), we can put his position quite sim-
ply: to say ‘I know’ is to guarantee.
Austin’s evidence for this hypothesis is phenomenological. He
points to the way we feel about uttering ‘I know’.
We all  feel the very great difference between saying
even “I’m  absolutely sure” and saying “I know”: it is
like the difference between saying even “I firmly and
1 Here one is reminded of what is perhaps Sellars’s most famous line:
“The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as
that of  knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that
episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of
justifying and being able to justify what one says” (Sellars 1963: 169).
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irrevocably intend” and “I promise”. If someone has
promised to do A, then I am entitled to rely on it, and
can myself make promises on the strength of it: and
so, where someone has said to me “I know”, I am enti-
tled to say I know too, at second hand. (Austin 1946:
172)
Here Austin goes beyond what he said in the previous quote. Previ-
ously he spoke of guaranteeing others the right to say ‘Q’. Here he
speaks of guaranteeing others the right to say ‘I know that Q’. But
that subtle difference is beside the main point. His main point is to
extend  the  analogy  between  ‘I  know’  and  ‘I  promise’.  Saying  ‘I
promise  to  A’  feels  a  certain  way,  and guarantees that  A will  be
done. Saying ‘I know that Q’ feels that same way, and so by analogy
likewise guarantees that Q is true.
In the next section we’ll consider Chisholm’s critique of Austin,
in light of which Chisholm’s own view takes shape.
3. Chisholm
Chisholm thought that the relationship between ‘I know’ and guar-
anteeing amounts to this: sometimes, but not always, when you say
‘I know that Q’, you thereby guarantee that Q.
Chisholm’s main criticism of Austin’s view is that it overlooks
an  important  difference  between performative  utterances  “in  the
strict sense” and “in the extended sense.”2 We can perform certain
2 Compare Searle’s (1979) distinction between “direct” and “indirect”
Knowledge Guaranteed 5
speech acts by simply saying that we are performing them. For ex-
ample in normal circumstances, by saying ‘I promise’, you thereby
promise; by saying ‘I apologize’, you thereby apologize; by saying ‘I
request’,  you  thereby  request;  and  so  on.  When  you  perform  a
speech act in this way, your utterance is a performative utterance
in the strict sense. Compare ‘I request you to pass the salt’ to ‘I want
the salt’. By saying ‘I want the salt’, you do not thereby want the salt
– any suggestion to the contrary is ridiculous. And yet, as Chisholm
(1966: 16 – 17) notes, ‘I want’ “is often used to accomplish what one
might accomplish by means of the strict performative ‘I request’.”
That is, often you can request me to pass the salt by saying ‘I want
the salt’. In virtue of this, we can consider ‘I want’ to be  a perfor-
mative  utterance  in  the  extended sense.  Other  phrases  similarly
qualify. For instance, whereas ‘I apologize’ is a strict performative,
‘I’m sorry’ can often be used to apologize.
Chisholm then remarks,
Clearly, “I know” is not performative in what I have
called the strict sense of the term, for knowing is not
an “act” that can be performed by saying “I know.” To
say “I promise that p,” at least under certain circum-
stances,  is to promise that  p; but to say “I know that
p” is not itself to know that p. (One may say “I hereby
promise,”  but not “I  hereby know.”)  “I  know” is re-
lated to “I guarantee” and “I give you my word” in the
way in which “I want” is related to “I request.” For “I
speech acts, or “primary” and “secondary” illocutionary acts.
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know” is often used to accomplish what one may ac-
complish by the strict performative “I guarantee” or “I
give you my word.” Hence, “I know” may be performa-
tive in an extended sense of the term. (Chisholm 1966:
17)
‘I want’ can still describe a state of mine even though it’s also being
used  performatively,  to  make  a  request.  ‘I’m  sorry’  can  still  say
something  about  me even though it’s  also  being  used performa-
tively, to make an apology. Likewise ‘I know’ “may serve both to say
something  about  me  and  to  provide  you  with  guarantees”
(Chisholm 1966: 17). Chisholm also notes that there are perfectly
ordinary situations in which to say ‘I know’ is not to guarantee. I
might, for instance “confess or boast to you” that I know something
you thought  only  you  knew,  even though “you  neither  need  nor
want my guarantee.”3
3 In fairness to Austin, he could handle this latter criticism by pointing
out that, generally speaking, performatives “come off” only against
certain background conditions. ‘I promote you’ can be used to pro-
mote  you,  but  only  if  you’re  eligible  for  the  promotion.  Likewise,
Austin might say, ‘I know’ can be used to provide you with a guar-
antee only if you’re eligible for the provision. But this response, while
plausible as far as it goes, does not address Chisholm’s more funda-
mental point, which is that ‘I know’ is a performative only in the ex-
tended sense, and so cannot  just be a way of guaranteeing, and
also  plausibly  has  a  “descriptive”  function  as  well.  Wittgenstein
(1975: §12) suggests a view similar to Austin’s, but which could ac-
commodate Chisholm’s insistence that ‘I know’ serves a descriptive
function. Says Wittgenstein, “For ‘I know’ seems to describe a state
of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact.”
In short, Wittgenstein suggests that by saying ‘I know’, you guaran-
tee by describing. See also §§433, 575; but compare §243.
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4. Sellars
Sellars thought that the relationship between ‘I know’ and guaran-
teeing amounts to this: ‘I know that Q’ means the same thing as ‘Q,
and I have reasons good enough to guarantee Q’.
Sellars considered Chisholm’s critique of Austin compelling, as
far as it went. But Sellars also suspected that Chisholm’s own an-
swer didn’t  capture the full  extent  of  the  relationship between ‘I
know’ and guaranteeing. Says Sellars,
I think that Chisholm is quite right about [the weak-
ness of Austin’s account]. On the other hand, it seems
to me that [Chisholm] overlooks the possibility  of a
connection between “I know” and “I guarantee” other
than the one he considers. “I know that-p” might be
related to “I guarantee that-p” not just as an autobio-
graphical description which on occasion performs the
same role as the latter[,] but as one which contains a
reference to guaranteeing in its very meaning. Is it not
possible  to  construe  “I  know  that-p”  as  essentially
equivalent to “p, and I have reasons good enough to
support a guarantee” (i.e., to say “I guarantee” or “You
can rely on my statement”)? (Sellars 1975: 100)
Sellars mentions four points in favor of  his semantic hypothe-
sis (1975: 100). First, it allows us to “recognize a performative ele-
ment in the very meaning of the verb ‘to know’,” while allowing for
Chisholm’s point that ‘to know’ is not a strict performative. Second,
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it  preserves  the  “pre-analytic  datum” that  there  is  a  “symmetry”
among first, second, and third-person uses of ‘to know’. Third, it al-
lows us to “appreciate the  context dependence of the adequacy in-
volved” in saying ‘I  know’.  Finally,  the account explains why our
‘knowledge’-thoughts are essentially interpersonal.
I’ll now discuss each of Sellars’s four points in turn, and then
present a more direct criticism of his semantic hypothesis.
Beginning with Sellars’s first point, it’s not clear that we ought
to recognize a performative element in the meaning of ‘know’, even
if  we acknowledge that  ‘know’  is  a  performative  in  the  extended
sense. We don’t think there’s a performative element in the mean-
ing of ‘want’, even though ‘want’ is a performative in the extended
sense. We don’t think that ‘I want X’ means ‘X is desirable, and I de-
sire it enough to support a request’, or any such thing. So there is
nothing in the profile of an extended performative to make us sus-
pect that the meaning of ‘know’ should reflect its performative po-
tential. Setting that aside, even if there is some pretheoretical pres-
sure to recognize a distinctive illocutionary force in ‘know’, there
are competing accounts of its illocutionary force. On one such ac-
count, to say ‘Smith knows that Q’ is to  credit Smith for having a
true belief that Q, as opposed to forming a true belief by luck (Greco
2003). On another account, to say ‘Smith knows that Q’ is to  ap-
prove of Smith as an informant about Q (Craig 1990). We would
need to adjudicate among all these theories before settling on Sell-
ars’s proposal.
Moving on to  Sellars’s  second point,  which is  somewhat  ob-
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scure, I do not detect the “symmetry” Sellars says he finds among
first, second and third-person knowledge attributions. To help us
understand the symmetry he has in mind, he says,
“He knows that-p” would entail “He has reasons good
enough to support a guarantee that-p”. (Sellars 1975:
100).
But it does not seem correct that the truth of ‘he knows’ entails the
truth of ‘he has reasons good enough to support a guarantee’, espe-
cially if we keep in mind that Sellars here refers to good enough eth-
ical reasons to support a guarantee. This connects with my main
positive  criticism  of  Sellars’s  semantic  proposal,  on  which  more
shortly.
As for Sellars’s  third point,  while  it  is  certainly true that the
propriety of saying ‘I know’ often depends on context, it’s not clear
how  this  tends  to  support  Sellars’s  semantic  proposal  about  the
meaning of ‘know’. Sellars says,
R1: “Reasons which might be adequately good to jus-
tify  a  guarantee  on one occasion might  not be  ade-
quate to justify a guarantee on another” (1975: 100).
This seems correct – the practical and ethical implications of guar-
anteeing are context-dependent. But compare:
R2: Reasons which might be adequately good to jus-
tify a request on one occasion might not be adequate
to justify a request on another.
This also seems correct – the practical and ethical implications of
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requesting are context-dependent. But this should not lead us to be-
lieve that ‘I want X’ means ‘X is desirable, and I have reasons ade-
quate to support a request’. And if the truth of R2 doesn’t support
the semantic hypothesis about ‘I want’, then the truth of R1 doesn’t
support Sellars’s semantic hypothesis about ‘I know’ either.
Moving on to Sellars’s fourth and final point, it again does not
seem true. That is, it does not seem true that “we rarely” think to
ourselves  ‘I  know this’,  or  wonder  ‘do  I  know this?’,  unless  “the
question of a possible guarantee to someone other than ourselves
has  arisen”  (Sellars  1975:  100).  On the  one  hand,  when making
plans, whether in concert with others or in isolation, we often won-
der  whether  we know things,  or  affirm that  we  do indeed know
them. Suppose I live alone in a small house in the country. I wonder
to myself,  “should I  leave the furnace on while  I’m gone for the
week?” Then I think, “Well, I know the forecast said to expect sub-
zero temperatures here this week, so I should leave it on to prevent
the pipes from cracking.” This seems perfectly natural and a com-
mon enough phenomenon, though no question has arisen about a
possible guarantee to another person. On the other hand, many of
us often wonder whether we know this or that out of sheer curiosity,
not because we’ve been prompted to consider offering someone a
guarantee.
So I’m not persuaded by any of the four points Sellars offers in
support of his semantic hypothesis. Aside from that, the hypothesis
seems doubtful in its own right. First, competent speakers do not
recognize it as true, which would be surprising if it were true. Sec-
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ond,  it  rules  out  by definition non-reason-based  knowledge.  But
many  serious  philosophical  proposals  about  knowledge  contem-
plate non-reason-based knowledge (e.g. Wittgenstein 1975: §§166,
253; Williams 1992; Sosa forthcoming: ch. 6). If these accounts are
wrong, it does not seem to be due to a semantic error.
5. A Different Approach
I propose that the relationship between ‘I know’ and guaranteeing
amounts to this: by saying ‘I know that Q’ you represent yourself as
having the authority to guarantee that Q.
I have two primary motivations for making this proposal. First,
like Sellars, I suspect that Chisholm’s suggestion, although correct
as far as it goes, does not fully capture the relationship between say-
ing ‘I know’ and guaranteeing. I suspect that the relationship goes
deeper than its sometimes being the case that saying ‘I know’ is a
way of guaranteeing. But unlike Sellars I do not aim to redeem this
suspicion by defining ‘know’ in terms of guaranteeing. Instead I aim
to redeem it by positing a normative connection between asserting
that you know and having the authority to guarantee. Second, the
proposal coheres seamlessly with an independently attractive view
about  the  epistemic  norm  of  assertion,  and  the  relationship  be-
tween asserting and guaranteeing.
My account proceeds from four assumptions. I’ll begin by ex-
plaining the assumptions, and then show how they support my pro-
posal.
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My first assumption is the well supported  knowledge account
of assertion (‘KA’ for short): you may assert Q only if you know Q.
The ‘may’ here designates epistemic permission – knowledge is es-
sentially the requisite  epistemic relation for assertion. It does not
follow that you morally  or prudentially  may assert  Q only if  you
know Q. The case for KA consists in a cumulative explanatory argu-
ment from conversational  patterns  (see  Unger  1975:  esp.  260 ff;
Slote 1979; Williamson 2000: chapter 11; Reynolds 2002, DeRose
2002, and [[citation omitted]]). I emphasize that my purpose here
is not to recount this argument, canvass objections, respond to ob-
jections, or evaluate competing proposals. That cannot responsibly
be done here.  For present  purposes,  I  simply  assume that  KA is
true, resting content with the considerable body of scholarship sup-
porting  it.  (For  critical  discussion  of  KA  see,  e.g.,  Weiner  2005,
Douven 2006, Lackey 2007, Hill and Schechter 2007, Levin 2008,
Kvanvig 2009, Brown forthcoming, and [[citation omitted]].)
My second assumption derives from the relationship between
asserting and guaranteeing.4 Other things equal, insofar as an asser-
tion is true, it is good qua assertion; insofar as it is false, it is bad
qua assertion. In virtue of this, let’s say that assertion aims at truth.
Other speech acts also aim at truth, such as guessing, conjecturing
and guaranteeing.  Call  speech acts  aimed at  truth  alethic speech
acts.5 Alethic  speech acts  differ  in  two important,  closely related
4 I defend the view sketched in this paragraph more fully in [[citation
omitted]].
5 What  I  call  “alethic  speech  acts”  correspond  largely  with  what
Searle (1975: section 4) calls “assertives.”
Knowledge Guaranteed 13
ways.  First,  some place  more credibility  on the  line  than others.
Guessing extracts little if any of your credibility. Conjecturing ex-
tracts more credibility than guessing, asserting more than conjec-
turing,  and  guaranteeing  more than  asserting.  Second,  the  more
credibility an alethic speech act extracts, the stricter the epistemic
norms governing it. Guessing requires virtually nothing by way of
evidence or epistemic standing: you may guess Q whenever you’d
like, arguably no matter what the evidence indicates. Conjecturing
requires that you have at least some evidence favoring Q, and per-
haps that Q be the most probable alternative given your evidence.6
Asserting Q requires that you know Q. Guaranteeing extracts more
credibility  than asserting,  so  guaranteeing  has  a  correspondingly
stricter requirement – it requires more than knowledge.  A natural
candidate for the epistemic norm of guaranteeing is knowledge of
knowledge: you may guarantee Q only if you know that you know Q.
Call  this  the  KK  account  of  guaranteeing (‘the  KK  account’  for
short).7
My third assumption concerns the relationship between utter-
ing a declarative sentence  and making an assertion. The primary
way we make an assertion is by uttering a declarative sentence. I as-
sert that Sarah will win by uttering ‘Sarah will win’. Of course, there
are other ways of asserting, such as writing or typing the sentence.8
6 Henry Jekyll  suggests as much when he writes to Utterson: “I  must
here speak by theory alone, saying not that which I know, but that
which  I  suppose  to  be  most  probable.”  See  the  final  section  of
Stevenson 1886: “Henry Jekyll’s Full Statement of the Case.”
7 [[citation omitted]]
8 It isn’t always the case that uttering the grammatically declarative
Knowledge Guaranteed 14
My fourth and final assumption is that when you (purport to)
perform an act,  you thereby represent yourself  as having the au-
thority  to  do  it,  that  is,  you  represent  yourself  as  satisfying  the
norms governing such an act. By inquiring on your behalf with the
tax office, I represent myself as having the authority to inquire on
your behalf.  By pronouncing a couple married,  the justice repre-
sents herself as having the authority to marry the couple. By declar-
ing that I promote you, I represent myself as having the authority to
promote you. And so on. Of course you needn’t explicitly claim that
you have the authority in order to represent yourself as having it.
Such representation is most often implicit and automatic.
With these four pieces in place – that is, the knowledge account
of assertion, the KK account of guaranteeing, the relationship be-
tween assertion and declarative utterance, and the relationship be-
tween acting and representing yourself as authorized – we are posi-
tioned to explain the relationship between saying ‘I know’ and guar-
anteeing. Here it goes:
When you say ‘I know that Q’, you thereby assert that you know
that Q. When you assert that Q, you represent yourself as having the
authority to assert that Q. And since knowledge is the norm of as-
sertion, you represent yourself as  knowing that you know that Q.
And since knowing that you know is the norm of guaranteeing, you
thus represent yourself as  having the authority to guarantee that
sentence ‘S’  amounts  to  asserting  that  S.  For  example,  if  I  recite
‘Sarah will win’ as one of my lines in a play, I do not thereby assert
that Sarah will win. We can set aside this complication for present
purposes.
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Q. Putting that all together, we get the following: when you say ‘I
know  that  Q’,  you  represent  yourself  as  having  the  authority  to
guarantee  that  Q.  That  is  the  relationship  between ‘I  know’  and
guaranteeing.
My proposal is not only perfectly consistent with Chisholm’s,
but it helps to explain why Chisholm’s proposal is true. It helps us
understand why saying ‘I know’ can be, and sometimes is, used as a
way of guaranteeing. My proposal also entails that ‘I know that Q’ is
descriptive and not merely performative, since by uttering it you say
something that is either true or false.
My proposal improves on Sellars’s while retaining its spirit. Al-
though ‘I know that Q’ doesn’t mean ‘Q, and I have reasons good
enough to guarantee Q’, by saying ‘I know that Q’ you do represent
yourself as having the authority to guarantee Q. Semantic equiva-
lence or entailment seem to be too strong a connection between ‘I
know’ and guaranteeing. Representation is a weaker, but neverthe-
less still intimate, connection. So my proposal ties ‘I know’ to guar-
anteeing more closely than Chisholm’s does, but not as closely as
Sellars’s does. Moreover my proposal accomplishes this without es-
sentially tying knowing to having reasons; it is perfectly consistent
with  (though it  does  not  entail)  the  hypothesis  that  non-reason-
based knowledge is possible.
6. Conclusion
In closing, let me say a word about my second assumption, namely,
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the KK account of guaranteeing. My other three assumptions are
fairly well established in the literature on either speech acts or epis-
temic norms – or at least well enough established to make it reason-
able to assume them for present purposes. The KK account of guar-
anteeing is a comparative newcomer on the scene. I do find the KK
account intuitively very plausible – especially when considered in
light of the evidence favoring the knowledge account of assertion –
but I’m not reduced to simply appealing to intuition here. We could
instead view my discussion as  providing evidence for the KK ac-
count, in the following way.
Suppose along with Austin, Chisholm and Sellars that there is
some  important  connection  between  ‘I  know’  and  guaranteeing.
And suppose that the other three, well established assumptions of
my account in section 5 are correct (i.e. the knowledge account of
assertion, the relation between declarative utterance and assertion,
and the relation between acting and representing yourself as autho-
rized). Now if the KK account of guaranteeing is correct, then it en-
ables an improved explanation of the connection between ‘I know’
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